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In this paper we describe a policy based authorisation infrastructure that a cloud provider
can run as an infrastructure service for its users. It will protect the privacy of users’
data by allowing the users to set their own privacy policies, and then enforcing them
so that no unauthorised access is allowed to their data. The infrastructure ensures that
the users’ privacy policies are stuck to their data, so that access will always be controlled
by the policies even if the data is transferred between cloud providers or services. This
infrastructure also ensures the enforcement of privacy policies which may be written
in different policy languages by multiple authorities such as: legal, data subject, data
issuer and data controller. A conﬂict resolution strategy is presented which resolves
conﬂicts among the decisions returned by the different policy decision points (PDPs).
The performance ﬁgures are presented which show that the system performs well and
that each additional PDP only imposes a small overhead.
© 2012 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
Cloud computing has brought us a new era of Internet based data storage and processing power. The cloud offers enor-
mous beneﬁts to businesses such as reduced costs, since they no longer need to spend large amounts of capital on buying
expensive application software or sophisticated hardware that they might never need. Instead they can perform their tasks
using cloud services – either application, infrastructure or platform services (AaaS, IaaS and PaaS respectively) – and pay
only for the resources they consume, when they need them. Cloud computing offers the opportunity to store a huge amount
of data relatively cheaply. Using the cloud, users can access the services or applications regardless of their location or com-
puting device/platform they use. However, despite all these beneﬁts the cloud has to offer, privacy and security issues are
still major challenges of cloud computing. There are many security issues to consider, including: ﬁne grained access to
cloud resources, privacy protection of data in the cloud, and auditing of cloud operations. Some threat models assume that
the cloud provider cannot be trusted, and therefore propose storing only encrypted data in the cloud. Others assume that
the cloud provider can be trusted, and that the threats come primarily from outside attackers and other cloud users. Given
that most public cloud services are currently being run by large trusted organisations such as Amazon, IBM, Microsoft and
Google, we believe that the latter threat model is reasonable for many users. Furthermore, organisations are now able to
run their own private clouds, using open source software such as Eucalyptus (http://eucalyptus.com/) and hence the trusted
provider model is the most appropriate one for this scenario. For example, the National Grid Service in the UK is already ex-
perimenting with private clouds for use by the academic community. Consequently the trusted provider model is the one we
adopt in this paper. Once we acknowledge this, we can start to design and build security and privacy protecting infrastruc-
tures that rely on a trusted cloud provider to operate parts of the infrastructure. We can then concentrate on the problems
of designing and building a large scale federated privacy preserving infrastructure with ﬁne grained access control and user
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access to their data, supported by appropriate legal contracts and audit trails, then cloud service providers should easily
consolidate the trust of their users.
In this paper we describe an authorisation infrastructure that a cloud provider can run as a service for its users, that
will allow the users to set their own privacy policies, thereby guaranteeing no unauthorised access to their data. The infras-
tructure ensures that these privacy policies are stuck to the users’ data, so that access will always be controlled by them
even if the data is transferred between cloud providers or services. This authorisation service accepts policy preferences
from users e.g. whom they want to share their data with, or when they want their data to be deleted. These preferences
are converted into policy rules and are stuck to the personal data within the service and when transmitting the data to
another service. A receiving service will only store the data if it supports a policy decision point (PDP) that can evaluate
the sticky policy language accompanying the data, otherwise it will refuse to accept it. Not only the user’s preferences but
also legal constraints will also be considered in order to assure privacy protection of the user’s data. We have converted
important sections of the EU data protection law into a policy which must be supported by each cloud service provider
operating in the EU [30]. However, the structure of our system is generic so that it is possible to add any additional country
speciﬁc legal constraints into the system, since we have separate policies for the law, data subject, data issuer and data con-
troller. The system is capable of resolving conﬂicts between the decisions returned by the PDPs evaluating these different
policies.
In cloud computing, one cloud provider may have to share data with other cloud providers, or release the data to
authorized requestors. The provider will need to ensure that the receiving party is willing to enforce the same privacy
policies for the data as itself, and will therefore need to send the sticky policies with the data. If the receiving party
receives the data and sticky policies then it can only enforce these policies if it supports the same policy languages as
the sender. Unfortunately there is no ubiquitously accepted standard for privacy policy languages. This is because different
policy languages support different rule sets; hence it is not possible to construct every type of required policy using just
one policy language. Therefore the same PDP cannot be used for evaluating all policies. Today we have many examples of
different policy languages e.g. XACMLv2 [2], XACMLv3 [3], PERMIS [4], P3P [5], Keynote [6] etc. and hence many differ-
ent PDP implementations. For example, XACMLv2 does not support delegation of authority whilst XACMLv3 and PERMIS
do. The XACML policy language assumes a stateless PDP hence cannot support state based policy rules such as separation
of duties (SoD), whilst PERMIS is state based and can support both dynamic and static SoD. Keynote on the other hand
uses the same language to describe both credentials and policy rules whereas none of the other policy languages do. P3P
is designed speciﬁcally to express privacy policies, whereas the others were designed as access control or authorization
policy languages. Hence the cloud authorization service must support multiple PDPs and we have introduced a compo-
nent (which we call the Master PDP) that can support multiple subordinate PDPs and resolve any conﬂicts between their
decisions.
Even though the policy handling authorisation infrastructure may be complex, we need to keep authorisation deci-
sion making as simple as possible for application developers when it is offered as an IaaS (Infrastructure as a Service).
The complexity should be hidden behind a standard web services interface and orchestration of the different authorisation
components should be done by the infrastructure itself. We propose this in our paper by using the OASIS SAML-XACML
protocol [21] to provide this web service.
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews related research. Section 3 describes the architecture of
our privacy preserving authorization infrastructure. Section 4 describes the sticky policy contents. Section 5 describes how
conﬂict resolution is performed. Section 6 describes the high level protocol exchanges for the receipt of data into the cloud,
and the transfer of data between cloud providers. Section 7 gives details of our implementation whilst Section 8 presents
the validation and performance results. Section 9 concludes and describes our future plans.
2. Related research
Robert Gellman’s report at the World Privacy Forum [1] focuses on privacy issues and legal compliance of sharing data
in the cloud. He mentions various legal issues such as the possibility of the cloud being in more than one legal location
at the same time with different legal consequences and such legal uncertainty makes it diﬃcult to assess the privacy
protection available to users. We cater for this by allowing different legal policies to be conﬁgured into our authorization
service and by allowing legal policies to stop data being transferred to jurisdictions which do not have proper privacy
protection.
Siani Pearson [10] has pointed out the key privacy requirements for clouds and a set of guidelines for designing the cloud
service with privacy protection. Siani Pearson et al. [11] have proposed to use accountability to enhance privacy protection in
the cloud. They have identiﬁed the key elements for provisioning accountability within the cloud. Siani Pearson et al. [12,13]
have proposed a privacy manager which would obfuscate personal data in the client site before sending it to the cloud
service provider. This approach would minimize the amount of sensitive data held within the cloud. Only the client will be
able to obfuscate or de-obfuscate data with their chosen key. The problem with this approach is that the applications that
are able to use the obfuscated data are limited and this will limit the services available to the user. Also the computation
overhead of obfuscating and de-obfuscating the data is large and so it imposes constraints on the computing resources
available to the user.
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Dan Lin et al. [14] have proposed a data protection model by which a potential cloud user can ﬁnd and choose a
cloud service provider based on a user based ranking of the service providers. The user can then integrate their pri-
vacy policy with that of the service provider and any subcontractors and this combined policy can be coupled with the
data, rather like our sticky policies. The work is still at a very preliminary stage and more design and implementation is
needed.
Wassim Itani et al. [15] have presented a security infrastructure for cloud providers to adopt. Privacy of the data in
the cloud is ensured by the use of a secure cryptographic co-processor which provides a trusted and isolated execution
environment in the computing cloud. But the price of the co-processor may not make the solution feasible.
Anonymity based privacy preservation methods in the cloud have been proposed by Jian Wang et al. [16]. They have
provided a simple example for anonymisation of some data based on the background knowledge of the service provider but
their work lacks the automation of such anonymisation and is suitable for very limited services.
As can be seem most prior research assumes that the cloud provider cannot be trusted, whereas our approach is to
assume that the cloud provider can be trusted to faithfully enforce the user’s privacy policy. Therefore we believe that
obfuscation or encryption of the user’s data is not necessary for many cloud usage scenarios, especially private clouds.
3. Architecture of the authorisation service
The overall architecture of our authorization web service is shown in Fig. 1. The AIPEP component offers an interface to
cloud application developers, to allow them to easily call the service, passing it the user’s sticky policy, obtaining authoriza-
tion decisions, and being returned the sticky policies that should be attached to the data when it is transferred to another
cloud service provider.
When the authorization service is offered as an IaaS service, then application or platform developers can build their
application services to call the AIPEP service according to their need without worrying about implementing the complex
authorization infrastructure which is offered as a service. For example, an enterprise wishing to provide privacy to their
customer’s personal data can build a user interface to their application, which will receive the privacy preferences of the
user along with the user’s private data, and can then submit this to their application service. The application service passes
the user’s policy and a request to store the user’s data to the AIPEP service. If the data storage is allowed the AIPEP will
ensure that the user’s privacy policy is stored and ensure that it is consulted on all subsequent access requests for the
data.
Policy based systems typically rely on an application independent policy decision point (PDP) to make authorization
decisions, and an application dependent policy enforcement point (PEP) to enforce these decisions. In our architecture the
PEP is built into the application service, and it is expected to enforce the authorization decisions and obligations returned
by the AIPEP service. We have introduced several new components into the cloud authorization service as described below.
1362 D.W. Chadwick, K. Fatema / Journal of Computer and System Sciences 78 (2012) 1359–13733.1. AIPEP service
Firstly we introduce the application independent policy enforcement point service, the AIPEP service. The AIPEP service
is responsible for accepting web services requests from applications, coordinating the actions of the various components
of the application independent authorization infrastructure, and then formulating web services decision responses to the
applications. Each request should contain: a unique reference (RID) to the user’s personal data, the sticky policy(ies) attached
to this data, and details about the application request that was received in step 0 of Fig. 1. These latter details, called the
request context in the XACML standard [2] typically comprise: the user’s credentials, the type of application request being
made by the user, expressed as the attributes of the action and the resource, and any supporting context parameters (such
as time of day). Upon receiving this request, the AIPEP ﬁrst stores the policy in the policy store and spawns a new PDP to
handle it. It also binds the policy to the resource in the sticky store (step 2). The AIPEP retains a manifest which records
which subordinate PDPs are currently spawned and which policies each is conﬁgured with. The AIPEP tells the Master PDP
which set of spawned PDPs to use for a particular authorization decision request (step 3). The master PDP returns the
overall decision (step 10) which may contain “before” obligations (see later). If so, the AIPEP calls the obligation service
(step 11) to enforce these obligations, before returning the decision result to the application (step 13). The application is
then responsible for calling the obligations service for any “after” and “with” obligations to be enforced.
3.2. Credential validation service
In attribute based access controls (ABAC), the PDP makes it decisions based on the attributes of the subject, requested
action, resource object and environment. In the XACML model all these attributes are provided by a Policy Information
Point (PIP) and the subject’s attributes are always assumed to be valid. In reality, subjects are issued with digitally signed
credentials or claims by a number of different remote attribute authorities (AAs), some of which may be trustworthy, others
which may not be. Whilst a PIP can usually reliably obtain the attributes of the resource object and the user’s requested
action, and in most cases those of the environment, reliably validating the credentials of the subject requires considerably
more effort. This suggests there are different types of PIP. We thus need a type of PIP that is responsible for validating
subject credentials, extracting the valid attributes from them and discarding the rest. We propose a credential validation
service (CVS) for this [9].
The CVS is a specialized policy information point (PIP) that is conﬁgured with a credential validation policy. This policy
tells it which credentials are valid, in terms of who the trusted authorities (IdPs) are and which attributes each are trusted
to issue to which groups of cloud users. As pointed out in [29] delegation of authority is often an essential requirement
in data-driven science projects where scientists often want to delegate access rights to a particular data set to an applica-
tion/job running on their behalf. When delegation of authority is in operation, delegation chains of credentials may exist.
The credential validation policy should therefore also contain a delegation policy that tells it which delegated credentials it
can trust. The CVS should be able to work in either pull mode, push mode or pull and push mode. Pull mode means that
the request did not contain any credentials and requires the CVS to pull them itself from its conﬁgured trusted attribute
authorities, or a subset of them. In push mode the PEP pushes the credentials to the AIPEP, and in pull push mode some
credentials are pushed and the remained have to be pulled. There currently isn’t a standard policy language for a CVS pol-
icy, and in [9] we say why XACMLv2 is not suﬃcient for this (neither is XACMLv3). Consequently we have deﬁned our own
policy language for this.
Once the CVS has ﬁnished validating the subject’s credentials, these are returned to the PDP as standard XACML format-
ted attributes (step 8).
3.3. Master PDP
In order to evaluate multiple authorization and privacy policies in different languages we introduce a new conceptual
component called the Master PDP. The Master PDP is responsible for calling multiple PDPs (step 4) as directed by the AIPEP,
obtaining their authorization decisions (step 9), and then resolving any conﬂicts between these decisions, before returning
the overall authorization decision and any resulting obligations to the AIPEP (in step 10). Each of the policy PDPs supports
the same interface, which is the XACML request-response context [2]. This allows the Master PDP to call any number of
subordinate PDPs, each conﬁgured with its own policy in its own language. This design isolates this policy language from
the rest of the authorization infrastructure, and the Master PDP will not be affected by any changes to any policy language
as it evolves, or by the introduction of any new policy language.
3.4. Policy store
PDPs need to obtain their policies from somewhere. The XACMLv2 standard proposes a functional component called
the Policy Administration Point (PAP) which is responsible for creating the policies and making them available to the PDP
through some back channel prior to the PDP making its decisions. The back channel could be, for example, an API to an
integrated database, or a communications link to an external repository. However, using a back channel and previously
prepared policies is too static and not suﬃcient for all use cases, especially for the privacy policies that originate from
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policy and so the policy needs to be prepared by the user, stuck to the data and transferred via the front channel to the
cloud at the same time as the user’s data. Using this method for obtaining policies means that we can use the same method
when transferring user data and sticky policies between cloud providers.
The policy store is the location where policies can be safely stored and retrieved. When the AIPEP stores a policy in the
policy store, it is returned a unique reference to the policy, called the policy id (PID). The AIPEP can subsequently use this
reference to retrieve the policy in order to spawn a new PDP.
3.5. Sticky store
The sticky store holds the mapping between sticky policies (PIDs) and the resources (RIDs) to which they are stuck. This
is a many to many mapping so that one policy can apply to many resources and one resource can have many sticky policies
applied to it.
3.6. Obligations service
Obligations are actions that must be performed when a certain event occurs. When the event is an authorization decision,
then the obligations are actions that must accompany this decision. Enforcement of obligations, such as sending an email
to a user when his/her data is accessed, or writing to an audit trail, or deleting data of a user after a certain time, is
very important for a privacy preserving system. Some obligations need to be performed “before” the decision is enforced,
some “after” the decision has been enforced, and some along “with” the enforcement of the authorization decision [7].
We call this the temporal type of the obligation. Examples are as follows: before the user is given access, increase the
amount of logging to monitor what he is doing; after the user has been given access, record the amount of cpu that was
used; simultaneously with the user’s access, decrement his account balance. As described in [7] the failure semantics of
each is as follows: a before obligation will be enacted even if the user’s action subsequently fails, an after obligation may
fail to be performed even if the user’s action succeeded, and a with obligation should only succeed if the user’s action
succeeds, and should fail if the user’s action fails. The presence of a “with” temporal type means that these obligations
(at least) have to be atomic with the enforcement of the user’s action, e.g. by supporting two-phase commit. Thus there are
multiple places where obligations need to be enforced. Some obligations have been introduced to make up for deﬁciencies
in the PDP’s policy language, for example, [8] speciﬁes how obligations can be used to specify over-ride policies in the
XACML language, whilst [7] speciﬁes how obligations can be used to support state based decision making in stateless PDPs
such as XACML ones. Given that there are multiple places where obligations need to be enforced and that some have to
be performed before the user’s action is enforced, whilst others are extensions of the functionality of the PDP, then it
would be sensible to have these obligations enacted by a cloud infrastructure service, thereby reducing the burden on the
application or platform developer. We propose an obligations cloud service with a standard interface that can be called from
multiple places in an application work ﬂow, with one of these places being in the application independent authorization
infrastructure service.
According to the XACML model, each obligation has a unique ID (a URI). We follow this scheme in our infrastructure.
Each obligations service is conﬁgured at construction time with the obligation IDs it can enforce and which obligation
handling service is responsible for enacting each one. It is also conﬁgured with the temporal type(s) of the obligations it
is to enforce. When passed a set of obligations by the AIPEP, or the application service, the obligations service will walk
through this list, ignore any obligations of the wrong temporal type or unknown ID, and call the appropriate obligation
handling service for the others. If any single obligation handling service returns an error, then the obligations service stops
further processing and returns an error to the caller. If all obligations are processed successfully, a success result is returned.
Each of the obligations enforced by the AIPEP must be of temporal type before.
4. Sticky policy contents
A sticky policy comprises:
– The policy author i.e. the authority which wrote the policy.
– The time of creation of the policy.
– The type(s) of resource(s) that are covered by this policy.
– The type of policy this is.
– The policy language.
– The policy itself, written in the speciﬁed policy language.
Any number of sticky policies can be stuck to a data resource in either an application dependent manner e.g. as a
<Condition> in a SAML attribute assertion, or by using the StickyPAD (sticky policy(ies) and data) XML structure that we
have deﬁned (see Appendix A). Ideally the policies should be stuck to the data by using a digital signature, to ensure their
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strong binding. This could be by using the XML <ds:Signature> structure in the StickyPAD and SAML attribute assertion, or
it could be externally provided e.g. by using SSL/TLS when transferring the data and policy across the Internet.
It is the responsibility of the sending application service to create the equivalent of the StickyPAD structure when sending
data with a sticky policy attached to it, to another application service, and the receiving application to validate this signature
when it receives the message in step 0 of Fig. 1. The application should then parse and unpack the contents and pass the
sticky policy to the AIPEP along with the authorization decision request (step 1 of Fig. 1).
Various types of sticky policy may be deﬁned:
– Authorization policy – this says who is authorized to perform which actions on the associated data/resource. There
may be several of these policies in a single StickyPAD (or its equivalent), with each policy being written by a different
authority such as the data subject, the data issuer (e.g. IdP) and the legislative authority. Each authz policy has an
author, so that it can be referred to by the conﬂict resolution policy (see later).
– Conﬂict resolution policy – says how conﬂicts between the different authorization policy decisions are to be resolved.
This policy may contain additional obligations that are to be returned along with any obligations returned by the
subordinate PDPs. There may be several of these policies in a single StickyPAD, with each policy being written by a
different authority. Which one takes precedence is determined by the authority hierarchy (see later).
– Audit policy – says what information should be audited when the associated data/resource is accessed. There may be
more than one audit policy written by different authorities, and the ﬁnal audit policy used by the audit system will be
the union of all individual audit policies contained in the StickyPAD.
– Privacy policy – contains privacy speciﬁc rules such as retention periods and purposes of use. These may be combined
in the authorization policy depending upon the speciﬁc authz policy language used, but not all authorization policy
languages can support all privacy speciﬁc rules. There may be more than one privacy policy in a StickyPAD and the
ﬁnal privacy policy will be the intersection of all the individual privacy policies.
– Authentication policy – says what level of authentication/assurance is required of requesting subjects who are to be
allowed to access the associated data. Whilst it is possible to represent this policy in the authorization policy through
the use of Level of Assurance, as for example as described in [28], by keeping this as a separate policy it allows the PEP
to short circuit the whole authorization process if the requesting subject has not been authenticated suﬃciently.
– Data manipulation policy – provides rules for how the associated data (usually PII) can be transformed, enriched or
aggregated with other personal data of the same data subject or of other data subjects.
5. Conﬂict resolution policy
Our system includes many different PDPs each with policies from different authorities and possibly written in different
languages. As a consequence a mechanism is needed to combine the decisions returned by these PDPs and resolve any
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multiple subordinate PDPs and resolving the conﬂicts among their decisions.
The Master PDP has a conﬂict resolution policy (CRP) consisting of multiple conﬂict resolution rules (CRRs). The default
CRP is read in at program initialisation time and additional CRRs are dynamically obtained from the subjects’ and issuers’
sticky policies. Each conﬂict resolution rule (CRR) comprises:
– a condition, which is tested against the request context by the Master PDP, to see if the attached decision combining
rule should be used,
– a decision combining rule (DCR),
– optionally an ordering of policy authors (to be used by FirstApplicable DCR),
– an author, and
– a time of creation.
A DCR can take one of ﬁve values: FirstApplicable, DenyOverrides, GrantOverrides, SpeciﬁcOverrides or MajorityWins
which applies to the decisions returned by the subordinate PDPs. The DCRs will be discussed shortly.
The Master PDP is called by the AIPEP and is passed the list of PDPs to call and the request context. From the request
context it obtains the information such as requester, requested resource type, issuer and data subject of the requested
resource. The Master PDP has all the CRRs deﬁned by all the different authors as well as a default one. From the request
context it knows the issuer and data subjects and so can determine the relevant CRRs. It will order the CRRs of law, issuer,
data subject and data controller sequentially. For the same author the CRRs will be ordered according to their time of
creation.
All the conditions of a CRR need to match with the request context for it to be applicable. The CRR from the ordered
CRR queue are tested one by one against the request context. If the CRR conditions match the request context the CRR is
chosen. If the CRR conditions do not match the request context the next CRR from the queue will be tested. The default
CRR (which has DCR = DenyOverrides) is placed at the end of CRR queue and it will only be reached when no other CRR
conditions match the request context. The PDPs are called according to the DCR of the chosen CRR.
Each PDP can return 5 different results: Grant, Deny, BTG, NotApplicable and Indeterminate. NotApplicable means that
the PDP has no policy covering the authorisation request. Indeterminate means that the request context is either mal-
formed e.g. a String value is found in place of an Integer, or is missing some vital information so that the PDP does not
currently know the answer. BTG (Break the Glass) [17] means that the requestor is currently not allowed access but can
break the glass to gain access to the resource if he so wishes. In this case his activity will be monitored and he will be
made accountable for his actions. BTG provides a facility for over-riding access controls in an emergency.
If DCR = FirstApplicable the CRR is accompanied by a precedence rule (OrderOfAuthors) which says the order in which
to call the PDPs. For example, if (resourceType = PII, requestor = data subject) DCR = FirstApplicable, OrderOfAuthor = law,
dataSubject, holder. The Master PDP calls each subordinate PDP in order (according to the order of authors), and stops
processing when the ﬁrst Grant or Deny decision is obtained.
For SpeciﬁcOverrides all PDPs are interrogated and the decision returned by the PDP containing the rule with the most
speciﬁc subject/resource has priority over all the other PDPs. Note that in general rules will only be returned with Grant,
Deny and BTG responses, and not with NotApplicable or Indeterminate, but if they are, they will be ignored in preference
to the former. As the Master PDP does not know any of the rules, then each PDP needs to return the rule that caused its re-
sponse together with its decision, in order for the Master PDP to determine which PDP has the most speciﬁc subject/resource
rule. In cases of conﬂict, speciﬁc subjects are deemed to override speciﬁc resources. So the Master PDP will consult a sub-
ject ontology to determine which of the returned rules has the most speciﬁc subject. If multiple PDP rules have the most
speciﬁc subject the Master PDP will choose the most speciﬁc resource among the rules having the most speciﬁc subject
(the resource with the longest path name is deemed to be the most speciﬁc resource, for example C:/MyDocument/MyFile
is more speciﬁc than the C:/MyDocument). If multiple PDP rules have the most speciﬁc subject and resource the decision
of the PDP with the latest creation time will be chosen. If any of the PDPs does not return a rule with its decision then
it is not possible to implement SpeciﬁcOverrides for this PDP as there is no way of determining whether it had the most
speciﬁc subject or not. In this case we can either assume that the rule was the most generic and that this PDP comes last
in the order of precedence, or we can replace the SpeciﬁcOverrides rule with a default rule. Deny Overrides is implemented
as the default fallback strategy in this case.
For DenyOverrides and GrantOverrides the Master PDP calls all the subordinate PDPs and combines the decisions using
the following semantics:
– DenyOverrides – A Deny result overrides all other results. The precedence of results for deny override is Deny>Indeter-
minate>BTG>Grant>NotApplicable.
– GrantOverrides – A Grant result overrides all other results. The precedence of results for grant override is Grant>BTG>In-
determinate>Deny>NotApplicable.
When a ﬁnal result returned by the Master PDP is Grant (or Deny) the obligations of all the PDPs returning a Grant (or
Deny) result are merged to form the ﬁnal obligation.
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the majority number of PDPs. If the same number of PDPs return Grant/Deny and BTG then Deny will be the ﬁnal answer.
If fewer Denies are returned and same number of Grant and BTG is returned then BTG will be the ﬁnal answer. If Deny
(or Grant) is the ﬁnal answer then all the obligations of this returned decision will be merged. If none of the PDPs return
Grant/Deny/BTG then Indeterminate will override NotApplicable.
The law and controller PDPs are common for all request contexts. Based on the request context the issuer and the data
subject’s PDP policies may be overriden.
6. Protocol exchanges
6.1. User input of PII and sticky privacy policy
The user is presented with an application dependent GUI and is asked to enter their PII. We require existing GUIs to be
enhanced to invite the subject to choose or enter their privacy policy. We do not specify how this is done. Organisations may
have a limited number of options that a user can choose from e.g. a set of purposes, retention periods, audit requirements
etc., or they may provide the user with the ability to enter their own fully speciﬁed privacy policy encoded in some standard
policy language such as XACML or EPAL. Our infrastructure service is not constrained in the privacy policy languages that it
can support, subject to the availability of an appropriate PDP that can evaluate authorisation decision requests and return
an authorisation decision response via the AIPEP interface.
When the application service receives the user’s input, it must extract the subject’s privacy policy from the application
layer message and pass this to the AIPEP in the authorisation decision request “can this user submit this PII (with this
unique RID) to the data cloud store, using this sticky policy in conjunction with the existing policies”. In this way the
application does not need to understand the contents of the subject’s privacy policy since the authorisation infrastructure
will handle it in an application independent way. The AIPEP takes the policy, stores it in the policy store and is returned
the PID of the policy. It then constructs a new PDP that can process this policy, passing it either the policy or the PID
depending upon how the PDP is constructed. The AIPEP has a manifest that records the number of PDPs that are currently
active, along with their PIDs. These include the PDPs that were initialised when the authorisation infrastructure service
was started, plus any additional PDPs that have been dynamically constructed since then. The size of the manifest is an
implementation conﬁgurable parameter depending upon the capacity of the cloud. Once the PDP has been constructed the
AIPEP passes the authorisation decision request to the Master PDP along with the set of PDPs that should be used to process
this request.
The Master PDP consults its conﬂict resolution policy to determine how to resolve the authorisation decisions from the
multiple PDPs. The Master PDP then calls the subordinate PDPs, either sequentially (ﬁrst applicable rule) or in parallel
(override rules) and analyses the returned decisions according to the rule. If the CRR is deny or grant overrides, and there is
more than one such response of the same type, then the obligations from all such similar responses are combined together
in the response that is returned to the AIPEP by the Master PDP. If a grant is returned this will contain at least one “before”
obligation which instructs the authorisation system to store the subject’s sticky policy in the sticky store.
The AIPEP calls the obligations service passing it the set of received obligations. This obligations service is only conﬁgured
to process “before” type obligations, one of which will be instructions to the sticky store obligation service to store the
subject’s sticky policy. Other “before” type obligations may be conﬁgured into any of the policies of the subordinate PDPs,
such as “audit the authz decision” etc. Only if all “before” type obligations are successfully enacted will the AIPEP return
granted to the PEP. If any of the obligations fail to be enacted, then the AIPEP will return a deny response and will rollback
its actions i.e. remove the subject’s privacy policy from the policy store, terminate the appropriate subordinate PDP and
remove it from its manifest.
When the application service receives the granted response it will store the user’s PII in its cloud storage.
6.2. Client access to a user’s data
When a client wishes to access a user’s data, the application service intercepts the client’s request and makes an au-
thorisation decision query to the authorisation infrastructure service asking if this client has permission to read (or other
access mode depending upon the client’s request) the data identiﬁed by its unique RID. The AIPEP queries the sticky store
to ask which sticky policies are bound to the resource with this RID. The sticky store returns the set of policy PIDs that are
applicable.
The AIPEP consults its manifest to see which of these policies are currently loaded into PDPs, and if some are not,
retrieves the appropriate policies from the policy store and initialises the corresponding subordinate PDPs. It then passes
the authorisation decision request to the Master PDP along with the set of PDPs to query. The Master PDP consults its
conﬂict resolution policy to determine which strategy to use (ordered or unordered) and passes the authorisation decision
request to the subordinate PDPs either sequentially or in parallel. It then analyses the returned responses according to
the governing conﬂict resolution rule and passes the appropriate response plus the combined set of obligations to the
AIPEP.
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to the application service, otherwise a deny is returned. In this way the user’s privacy policy is enforced along with any
legal and organisational policies for accessing the data.
6.3. Transfer of data to another cloud provider
This protocol ﬂow is very similar to client access to a user’s data, but with the following differences. The authorisation
decision request now becomes “has this third party cloud permission to retrieve the data identiﬁed by this unique RID”.
When the subordinate PDPs are asked if the third party is allowed to retrieve the PII, then along with each grant decision
there may be a “before” obligation which instructs the authorisation system to retrieve the PDP’s policy from the sticky
store and return it to the application service, which is now required to put this sticky policy in the relevant application
protocol ﬁeld. On the third party’s side the sticky policy has to be extracted from the relevant protocol ﬁeld.
Once the third party cloud receives the response to its request, the protocol ﬂow is now very similar to that described
in Section 6.1. The cloud application extracts the sticky policy(ies) and passes this/these to the authorisation infrastructure
service along with the authorisation decision request “can this third party receive this data (with this unique RID) into its
data store, using this policy(ies) in conjunction with the existing policies”. Providing the local legal policy grants permission
with a CRR of deny overrides (or is silent on this issue), then the user’s policy will be enforced as directed by their sticky
policy. The latter policy at least will require the third party to store and enforce the user’s policy, and this will cause a
before obligation to be returned to the AIPEP, which will ensure that the sticky policy is safely stored in the authorisation
infrastructure before returning grant to the receiving application. If the authorisation infrastructure is not able to enforce
the sticky policy obligation then the application will be denied permission to receive the user’s data.
7. Implementation details
The authorization infrastructure is implemented in Java, and is being used and developed as part of the EC TAS3
Integrated Project (www.tas3.eu). The ﬁrst beta version is available for download from the PERMIS web site at http://
sec.cs.kent.ac.uk/permis/downloads/Level3/standalone.shtml. This contains the AIPEP, CVS, the Obligations Service, a Master
PDP and the ability to dynamically spawn new subordinate PDPs.
A number of different obligation services have been written that are called by the obligations service, and these can
perform a variety of tasks such as write the authorization decision to a secure audit trail, send an email notiﬁcation to a
security oﬃcer, and update the internal state information (called retained ADI in ISO 10181-3 [18]). We have implemented
state based Break The Glass policies [17] using the AIPEP, the obligations service and a stateless PDP. A live demo of BTG is
available at http://issrg-testbed-2.cs.kent.ac.uk/.
The authorization infrastructure service has been tested with three different PDPs: Sun’s XACML PDP [19], the PERMIS
PDP and a behavioral trust PDP from TU-Eindhoven [20]. Each of these PDPs uses a different policy language. Sun’s PDP
uses the XACML language, the PERMIS PDP uses its own XML based language whilst TU-Eindhoven’s PDP uses SWI-Prolog.
7.1. Protocol interfaces
We use standard web services protocols wherever possible. The AIPEP supports two different protocols, one for requesting
an authorization decision and one for requesting credential validation.
The former uses the SAML-XACML protocol [21] as proﬁled by the OGF in [22]. This SAML proﬁle allows an XACML
formatted authorization decision request to be combined with the policy that is to be used by the PDP and both passed as a
SAML query in a new element called an XACMLAuthzDecisionQuery. The SAML response allows an XACML response context,
containing a response and optional obligations, to be returned in a newly deﬁned SAML assertion, the XACMLAuthzDecision-
StatementType. Other optional parameters can also be in the assertion, such as an altered request context which contains
the set of attributes that were actually used in the authorization decision making. The OASIS XACML TC has recently agreed
to enhance this protocol so that policies in any language can be transferred from the PEP to the PDP – the original version
mandated that the policies had to be written in the XACML language.
We have speciﬁed how various types of un-validated credentials such as SAML attribute assertions, X.509 public
key certiﬁcates and X.509 attribute certiﬁcates can be passed to the AIPEP service in an Open Grid Forum proﬁle [23]
of [21].
The latter uses WS-Trust as proﬁled by the OGF in [24]. The protocol we use for communicating between the AIPEP
and the CVS is based on WS-TRUST [25] and SAMLv2 [26] and the complete proﬁle is speciﬁed as an Open Grid Forum
proﬁle [22]. We have enhanced this protocol to allow different credential validation policies to be dynamically transferred
to the authorization infrastructure, but we have not yet had time to progress this through the standardization process.
The WS-Trust protocol tells the CVS to work in either push or pull mode, or a combined push-pull mode. The CVS can
dynamically retrieve (additional) user credentials from any number of external attribute authorities or repositories. We
currently support two protocols for this: LDAP queries and SAMLv2 attribute queries. We support credentials formatted
as SAML attribute assertions, LDAP attributes or X.509 attribute certiﬁcates. We have also speciﬁed an Open Grid Forum
proﬁle for the protocol to pull credentials [24], which is based on SAMLv2. Our CVS implementation however is more
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Conﬁgured Legal policies.
No. Policy
1. A data subject can send update requests for his/her personal data
2. A data subject is rejected to access his/her personal data if LegalObjection = true
3. A data subject is rejected to access his/her personal data if NationalSecurityIssue = true
4. A data subject is rejected to access his/her personal data if the data is classiﬁed as a therapeutic exception or as Dr’s personal notes.
5. A data subject can view his/her personal data if the data is not classiﬁed as a therapeutic exception or as Dr’s personal notes, LegalObjection =
false and NationalSecurityIssue = false
6. Legal Authority and National SecurityAuthority can read any personal data for the purpose of legal proceedings / prospective legal proceedings /
obtaining legal advice/ establishing a legal claim / exercising a legal claim / defending a legal claim / administration of justice / prevention of
real danger / suppression of a criminal offence / satisfying an important public interest
7. Medical professionals can BreakTheGlass to access to medical data for purpose of medical diagnosis / the provision of care and treatment /
preventive medicine / management of health care services
sophisticated than this, and can also pull X.509 attribute certiﬁcates from an LDAP repository or WebDav server [27], LDAP
string attributes from a trusted LDAP server, and follow delegation chains of credentials. Push mode means that the request
message contains the full set of credentials which are to be validated by the CVS, and none further need to be pulled.
Note that the push/pull dialect ﬁeld is advisory only, since the CVS is allowed to pull further credentials if it needs to. For
example, if the AIPEP sent a delegated credential to be validated and the delegator is not a root of trust in the CVS’s policy,
then the credentials of the delegator will need to be pulled. Pull and push mode, as its name implies, is requesting the CVS
to validate the credentials in the request message and pull any further credentials that it can ﬁnd for the subject of the
authorization decision query. Again an advice ﬁeld can specify a subset of the AAs/IdPs to pull from.
The Master PDP currently talks to the subordinate PDPs using either the XACML request response context or the SAML-
XACML protocol.
8. Validation and performance results
We validated the correct operation of the authorization infrastructure by running it on a small cloud server, details
below. We ﬁrst devised a test scenario, along with a series of tests, to validate that the correct authorization decisions were
being returned by the authorization infrastructure, and then we carried out a series of performance tests to measure how
quickly the correct authorization decisions could be made (along with storing and retrieving the user’s sticky policies).
8.1. Validation tests
In order to validate that the authorization infrastructure returns the correct authorization decisions we devised the
following scenario:
Patient M registers with the Local Health Centre and ﬁlls in a registration form with his personal details. He is also
given a form where he enters his policy about who can access his medical records and personal details. This is mainly a
tick box form so that the patient does not need to be worried about knowing any speciﬁc policy language. The patient’s
privacy preferences are automatically translated into a privacy policy which is stuck to his personal data and submitted
into the system. Once registered, a doctor will perform a series of medical tests and enter these into the patient’s
electronic medical record which will also be stuck to the same privacy policy.
Suppose that initially M’s policy has only one rule saying that researchers are allowed to view his medical data if the
data can ﬁrst be anonymized. The mandatory legal policy that is already encoded into the system contains 7 policy rules,
summarized in Table 1 (these translate into 13 rules in the legal PDP because the data subject can be identiﬁed in several
different ways such as name and address or National Health Number). The Health Centre (data controller) also has its own
policy in a separate PDP which states “Medical Professionals of this Health Centre are allowed to READ/WRITE Medical data
for any patient”.
We then postulated a set of 25 test cases for different people wishing to access M’s medical records, including M himself,
his doctor, a nurse, a relative, a researcher etc. and manually determined what the correct results should be. We input these
requests into the authorization system, which was running 3 PDPs (the legal, data subject’s and data controller’s) and
analyzed the responses to see if they concurred with the correct results. Once the correct results were consistently obtained
from the authorization system, we then carried out a series of performance tests as described below.
8.2. Performance tests
The authorization infrastructure was up and running on a small cloud server, whose conﬁguration was: 2 CPUs each with
4 core and each core with hyper-threading support (equivalent to 16 core) with each core’s speed being 2.53 GHz; cache
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Time (in ms) to make an authorization decision and/or store/retrieve a sticky policy.
Test Mean Std Dev % Discarded
1. Request to store personal data and sticky policy 13.84 2.0 1.9
2. Authz decision with 3 PDPs 7.41 0.82 1.2
3. Request to transfer data (and retrieve sticky policy) 11.38 0.9 3.0
size for each core is 12 MB; memory is 25 GB in total. The conﬁguration for each Virtual Machine inside the cloud is: cpu
MHz = 2527; cache = 4096 kb; memory = ∼256 MB. We ran the authorization infrastructure as one VM, although further
performance improvements might be expected if the different components of the system, such as the obligations service
and subordinate PDPs are run in their own VMs.
The conﬁguration of the client machine, which performed the role of the cloud medical application running in a different
cloud was: cpu MHz = 2993.589 MHz; cache = 2048 KB; memory = 2052024 KB. Note that there was no underlying medical
application, as all the client machine did was make authorization decisions requests across a LAN and receive authorization
decisions. Because the client was operating across a local area network we realize that the results will be slower than if the
client was running inside another VM of the same cloud service, but they will be faster than if the cloud application was
being run by a different cloud provider accessing the storage service over the Internet.
Two series of tests were performed. The ﬁrst set tested how long it took for the authorization system to store and
retrieve a user’s sticky policy and make an authorization decision. The second set tested the reduction in performance for
an increasing number of PDPs running inside the authorization service.
For the second set of tests we had 1 to 10 PDPs, and each additional PDP had 1 rule in it. The PDPs were Sun’s XACML
PDP [19].
8.2.1. Making authorisation decisions
For the ﬁrst set of tests, the legal PDP had 13 rules in it and the data controller’s PDP had 1 rule in it. The user’s sticky
policy also had 1 rule in it and this policy was added in test 1 and transferred in test 3.
Test 1 was a request to store personal information along with a sticky policy. Three policies were evaluated (user’s,
legal and controller’s) and the request was granted. The user’s policy was stored by the authorization system. Test 2 was a
request by a third part to read the user’s personal information. The same three policies were interrogated and the decision
was granted. The third test was a request to move the user’s personal data to another cloud provider, the three policies
were interrogated, the request was granted, and the user’s sticky policy was returned with the decision.
Each test was run sequentially 500 times and then the mean time and standard deviation were calculated. Any results
that varied over 3 times the standard deviation from the mean time were removed as outliers. This resulted in up to 3% of
the results being discarded. The results are presented in Table 2.
From the results one can see that:
– The time to retrieve a sticky policy for transfer is approximately 4 ms.
– The time to store a sticky policy in a new PDP is approximately 6.4 ms.
A signiﬁcant amount of the time is spent in processing the SAML-XACML request and response messages and transferring
them across the LAN.
8.2.2. Increasing the number of PDPs
In this second series of tests the authorization server was conﬁgured with an increasing number of policies/PDPs, each
containing 1 rule. In the ﬁrst test the authorization server only had 1 policy conﬁgured into it (the legal PDP with 13 rules).
In the second test the authorization server was conﬁgured with the legal policy and the data controller’s policy. In the
third test the authorization server had 3 policies: the user’s sticky policy, and the controller’s conﬁgured policies. In the
subsequent tests an additional sticky policy was added. The number of rules in each additional PDP is kept the same for
this set of tests so that the results can’t be affected by various numbers of rules in different PDPs.
In each case we measured the time taken for an authorization decision to be made when a third party asked to read M’s
medical record, and a grant result was obtained. This necessitated all conﬁgured policies being interrogated and the Master
PDP determining the overall decision, using a GrantOverrides combining rule. The results are shown in Table 3.
9. Discussion, conclusions and future plans
We have built a sophisticated privacy protecting authorization infrastructure that provides a web service interface for
cloud providers to use. It can be used by an IaaS provider as part of the infrastructure offering to platform and application
developers. The latter may then use this to further develop privacy preserving applications. Our authorization infrastructure
does not obviate the need for trust, but rather is built on the assumption that cloud providers can be trusted to the extent
that they wish to provide an automated infrastructure that can easily enforce each other’s policies reliably and automat-
ically. If they cannot support an incoming sticky policy they will inform the sender of the fact. Our system provides IaaS
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Time (in ms) to make an authorization decision for different num-
ber of PDPs.
Test Mean Std Dev % Discarded Mean PDPi –
MeanPDPi-1
1 PDP 4.11 0.31 5.4
2 PDPs 5.40 0.73 3.8 1.29
3 PDPs 7.19 1.35 5.8 1.79
4 PDPs 10.17 0.49 5.6 2.98
5 PDPs 13.06 0.95 0.8 2.89
6 PDPs 15.63 1.11 1.0 2.57
7 PDPs 18.57 1.08 2.12 2.94
8 PDPs 21.34 1.2 1.9 2.77
9 PDPs 23.93 1.4 0.79 2.59
10 PDPs 25.54 1.5 1.0 1.61
providers with an application independent authorisation infrastructure that makes it easy for them to enforce users’ privacy
policies without having to write a signiﬁcant amount of new code themselves. Furthermore the user has the potential for
more complete control over his/her privacy than now, in that the infrastructure allows the user to specify a complete pri-
vacy policy including a set of obligations which can notify the user when his/her data is accessed or transferred between
organizations e.g. by using an after obligation when giving permission for the transfer of her data to go ahead or a before
obligation before giving permission for the data to be read. Of course, an untrustworthy cloud provider can always discard
any sticky policies it receives and never need access the authorisation infrastructure to ask for permission to receive the
data, but we assume that legally binding contracts between the cloud providers and their users will require them to sup-
port the sticky policies that are transferred to them. Our authorisation infrastructure makes it much easier for them to do
this.
Future work will look at how the authorization infrastructure can be partitioned into separate services running in dif-
ferent VMs, so as to increase its performance, as well as looking at how scalability can be achieved through horizontal
elasticity.
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The DataResource can be any data or resource which requires a sticky
policy.
Resource Types holds the type(s) of resource that are contained
in the DataResource e.g. it could be a computer system or an email
message
or some PII.
Any number of policies can be stuck to a DataResource.
The XML signature is optional because applications may choose to
























The Policy ID specifies the globally unique ID of the policy.
The PolicyLanguage specifies the language the policy is written in.
The PolicyAuthor specifies attributes of the person who wrote the
policy.
Time of Creation specifies when the policy was written.
Expiry time specifies after what time the policy should be ignored.
Infinity is the default.
Resource Type specifies the type(s) of resource this policy refers to.
The PolicyContents contains the policy written in the language
specified in PolicyLanguage.










<xs:attribute name="PolicyID" type="xs:anyURI" use="required"/>
<xs:attribute name="PolicyLanguage" type="xs:anyURI" use="required"/>
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